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Abstract
Traditional explicit authentication mechanisms, in which the device remains
unlocked after the introduction of some kind of password, are slowly being com-
plemented with the so-called implicit or continuous authentication mechanisms.
In the latter, the user is constantly monitored in one or more ways, in search
for signs of unauthorized access, which may happen if a third party has access
to the phone after it has been unlocked. There are some different forms of
continuous authentication, some of which based on Machine Learning. These
are generally black box models, that provide a decision but not an explanation.
In this paper we propose an approach for continuous authentication based on
behavioral biometrics, machine learning, and that includes domain-dependent
aspects for the user to interpret the actions and decisions of the system. It
is non-intrusive, does not require any additional hardware, and can be used
continuously to monitor user identity.
Keywords: Continuous authentication, Behavioral Biometrics, Mobile
Devices, Classification, Explainable AI
1. Introduction
Mobile devices in general, and smartphones in particular, have grown signif-
icantly in computational power and functionality in recent years, as well as in
their relevance in our daily living. Due to their pervasiveness, they now contain
or give access to a significant amount of our sensitive information, from social5
networks to bank accounts.
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In [1], the authors conclude that 4 in each 10 users of a smartphone store
information that they deem secret on their smartphone, and that 1 in each 3
smartphone owners had accessed or used a smartphone that was not theirs.
Indeed, the easiness with which we store sensitive information in these mobile10
devices makes it easier for unauthorized individuals to gain access to it [2].
Recently, Symantec conducted a social experiment in which 50 smartphones
without any authentication mechanism were left on the street, while the devices
were collecting data about usage patterns. Results show that 96% of the devices
were accessed by at least one person, and in 86% of these the users accessed15
personal information, such as social networks or e-mail accounts [3].
Smartphones are traditionally secured using information-based authentica-
tion mechanisms, notably passwords or visual patterns. In the last years, bio-
metric approaches started to be incorporated such as face recognition or finger-
prints. Section 2 analyzes these forms of authentication.20
This work proposes a novel authentication mechanism that relies on features
of the user’s interaction with the screen of the device. An individual interaction
model is created for each user, which is then used to continuously monitor
the interaction and determine when it deviates from the user’s known model.
Moreover, and as opposed to other approaches, the system is able to generate25
visualizations that allow the user to interpret and understand the decisions of
the system[4].
2. Existing Authentication Mechanisms
Authentication methods can be characterized as explicit or implicit/continuous.
Explicit methods require the input of some identifying information at a specific30
moment (e.g. fingerprint, password). The device remains indefinitely unlocked
afterwards. Implicit authentication, on the other hand, continuously monitors
the device in search for clues of unauthorized access, a case in which an explicit
authentication method is generally requested.
The most frequent methods are information-based passwords, which may in-35
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clude text, numbers or visual patterns. These methods are straightforward and
computationally efficient. However, it is also easy for a third party to observe
the device being unlocked and learn its unlock code/pattern. This is especially
true in public spaces, and more so in spaces that have video surveillance [5].
Users also tend to rely on codes/patterns that are easy to memorize, but also40
easy to guess. In [6], the authors show that in more than 9% of the times, an
unauthorized user manages to gain access to a device by "password-guessing"
in less than 3 attempts. In the case of visual patterns, it is often as easy since
the repeated use of the pattern leaves visible markings on the screen [5].
In order to solve some of these problems, and supported by recent techno-45
logical developments, the use of biometrics became the new standard. There
are two main categories: physiological and behavioral. The former relies on the
use of sensors such as video cameras or fingerprint scanners. The latter relies on
the analysis of user behavior while interacting with the device (e.g. movement
habits, network context) and in the detection of abnormal patterns.50
Some example of the latter include the analysis of specific gestures of the
user on the screen (e.g. drag, flick, pinch). In [7], a specifically designed glove
is used to acquire data. In [8], on the other hand, the authors analyze the
way the user types text using the virtual keyboard, using a so-called Typing
Authentication and Protection mechanism.55
The method proposed in this paper is different from the existing ones in the
sense that: 1) it does not require specific hardware or software; 2) it is based on
the user interaction with the screen but interaction features are acquired in a
transparent way; and 3) it is independent of the application. This approach is
based on previous results of the authors, in research work conducted to assess60
mental fatigue and stress in computer users [9, 10].
3. Architecture
This section describes the main components that implement the proposed
continuous authentication mechanism for mobile devices. It considers a central
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server, a back-office application, and the users’ smartphones (Figure 1). The65
server implements a REST API [11] that provides services that are used by both
the users’ smartphones and the backoffice.
The users’ smartphones use the endpoints of the API to send interaction data
to the server. Client applications need to implement their own logic to capture
user interaction, which is dependent on several aspects, including OS. However,70
the API is completely independent of the client and can be implemented in any
device that has a touch screen, internet connection and an API provided by the
OS to collect data from user interactions. Smartphones are encouraged to use
the local storage to temporarily store interaction data, and send it to the server
in batches at regular intervals in order to optimize battery consumption and75
network usage.
Finally, the backoffice includes a set of services aimed at managing the data
and the continuous authentication mechanism (e.g. adjusting sensitivity or
thresholds, adjusting model re-training intervals). It also includes tools for gen-
erating explanations about the user classification and accompanying intuitive80
data visualizations.
In the empiric study detailed in Section 4, an Android application was de-
veloped to implement the API in Android devices. In the server-side, Mon-
goDB database was used to store data. Profiling scripts and the generation of
visualizations were implemented in R. The lifecycle for model training was im-85
plemented using the H2O API. Finally, the REST API was implemented using
Node and Express. However, the proposed architecture is generic enough to be
implemented with equivalent technologies.
Whenever there was interaction with the application, it collected data de-
scribing touch events. In order to reduce variability, the application aggregates90
interaction data using a first-in first-out sliding window of size 30. The average
of each variable in the sliding window is calculated and stored locally until it is
sent to the server.
We propose the use of 12 interaction features. The first 9 describe the
maximum, average, and minimum values of touch duration, area and intensity.95
4
In order to calculate the other 3, we fit a quadratic curve to the intensity of
each touch over time. The curve obtained represents the touch pattern of the
user, and represents a composite feature: it combines the duration and intensity
dimensions. The remaining 3 variables are thus the coefficients of the quadratic
curve, respectively x2, x and n. This data is aggregated and processed locally100
in the device, and is then sent to a central server where it is stored.
Figure 1: Main modules of the proposed system.
4. Methodology
To validate this approach, an experiment was setup in which users inter-
acted regularly with their mobile devices, using a specifically developed applica-
tion. This was a game-like application, developed for Android devices, in which105
the users needed to complete relatively simple mathematics tasks and navigate
through menus. The main goal of the application was to collect interaction data
from each user.
Data was collected from 30 users, 15 women and 15 men, with ages ranging
between 10 and 67 (x̄ = 35.95, σ = 14.96). Users were individually brought in to110
a laboratory, in which they played the game. Users were not instructed regarding
the nature of the experiment beforehand. This resulted in the collection of 1665
instances of data (each representing the result of aggregating over a sliding
window of 30 touches). After collection, data was normalized.
Initially, data was visually and statistically analyzed in search for significant115
inter-user differences. As Figures 2 and 3 depict, there are indeed differences
between users. These Figures show, respectively, how touch duration and touch
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intensity are distributed for each user. Differences are clearly visible, not only
in terms of the median value but also of the distribution of the data.
This provides some support to the hypothesis that users may have different120
interaction patterns. Similar differences are observed in the remaining variables.
Figure 2: Distribution of average touch duration for all the users.
Figure 3: Distribution of average touch intensity for all the users.
4.1. User Interaction Model and Classification
This section describes the steps taken to create a so-called individual inter-
action model, based on the proposed interaction features, suitable to be used
for identity classification. To this end, the following approach was implemented.125
For each participant a dataset was built that contains all the interaction data
of that participant and, in the same proportion, data selected randomly from
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other participants. This provides us with a balanced dataset that contains data
from the actual participant associated to the dataset and from other random
participants. A new binary column was added to the dataset that encodes if130
each instance contains data of the participant associated to the dataset (true/1)
or from other participants (false/0).
For each of these 30 datasets a Neural Network [12] with 2 layers (of 200
neurons each) was trained. Thus, there is an interaction model for each par-
ticipant. These neural networks have thirteen inputs (the twelve interaction135
features plus the boolean predictor variable) and two outputs (the probability
of the classification result being true or false). The interaction model of each
user is updated at regular intervals, when new interaction data is available in
the central server. Models are stored in a central database, in which there is
one instance for each user.140
The continuous authentication service thus works as follows. The server’s
API accepts requests from mobile devices containing an instance of processed
interaction data and the identifier of the owner of the device in which the data
was collected. The service then retrieves that user’s interaction model from
the database, provides it with the interaction data, and obtains a classification145
result. Then, if this percentage is above a specific threshold, it is assumed that
the current user of the device is the authorized user. Otherwise, it is assumed
that an unauthorized user gained access to the device. The server does this for
each packet of interaction data and returns to the mobile device a classification
result for each one .150
If a packed of data is classified as belonging to the authorized user, it is
added to the database and is later used to update the interaction model of that
user, guaranteeing that it is always up to date, namely to reflect small variations
that happen over time.
Alternatively, if the packet is classified as an identity breach, the mobile155
device may choose to lock the screen and immediately request an explicit au-
thentication mechanism, such as a password or a fingerprint. Two cases can
occur: 1) The user succeeds in unlocking the device, the event is marked as a
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false positive, and the instance of data is saved in the database nonetheless; 2)
The user does not unlock thee device, the event is considered a true positive,160
and the data is discarded as it represents an interaction from a third party.
4.2. Experimental Results
To validate the proposed approach, data was split into two groups: the train
split holding 75% of the data (1248 instances) and the test split holding the
remaining 25% (417 instances). The train split was used to train one interaction165
model for each user, as detailed in Section 4.1.
Both splits were also transformed in order to simulate authentication breaches
since no unauthorized accesses took place during the data collection. To emulate
these unauthorized accesses, the users of 67% of the instances were randomly
changed and the instances marked as a positive. The remaining 33% were left170
unchanged.
After the training of the models, each instance of data in the test split was
then submitted to the classifier service, which classified it as breach (positive)
or no breach (negative) according to the supposed owner of the device and using
a threshold of 0.5.175
From the validation of each model the confusion matrix and the ROC curve
were created. However, their size prevents us from including them in this paper.
Instead, Table 1 summarizes the main metrics of each model.
In average, the accuracy of the 30 models for the test data is of 98.94%.
The average precision is 0.943 and the average recall is 0.9. In general, these180
are promising results that, albeit the relatively small number of users, indicates
that this approach may indeed be a suitable way to classify user identity in
mobile devices.
4.3. Explainability
Most of the existing authentication methods based on Machine Learning185
can be seen as a black box, that is, they do not provide an explanation or
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Table 1: Summary of the metrics of each model.
Model ID Accuracy Precision Recall AUC
1 1 1 1 1
2 0.9706 0.842 0.64 0.99
3 1 1 1 1
4 0.9363 1 0.278 0.955
5 1 1 1 1
6 0.9975 0.90 1 0.995
7 1 1 1 1
8 1 1 1 1
9 0.9829 1 0.696 0.989
10 0.9975 0.966 1 0.999
11 0.9510 0.368 0.467 0.924
12 1 1 1 1
13 1 1 1 1
14 0.9975 1 0.877 0.999
15 0.9975 1 0.889 0.999
16 0.9559 0.923 0.706 0.98
17 0.9668 0.956 0.796 0.982
18 1 1 1 1
19 1 1 1 1
20 0.9975 1 0.90 0.999
21 1 1 1 1
22 0.9877 0.789 0.938 0.988
23 1 1 1 1
24 0.9828 0.74 0.895 0.992
25 0.9775 1 0.958 0.999
26 1 1 1 1
27 1 1 1 1
28 1 1 1 1
29 0.9951 0.917 0.917 0.999
30 0.9975 0.889 1 0.999
justification for the result of the user classification mechanism. This signifi-
cantly decreases the transparency of the whole system, and the user is limited
to accepting its decision without clearly understanding why. In the proposed
approach, explanations exist in two different ways.190
The first is based on the importance of each feature in the model. In the soft-
ware package used, variable importance is calculated using the Gedeon method
and it provides the user with information regarding how important each variable
is for predicting user identity. Depending on the users’ interaction patterns, the
variables in each model will have different relative importance. This information195
can be used per se, or can be used to select the variables to show in the visual-
izations described next. The second is based on a visual analysis that compares
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the interaction profile of the user against the data being classified, that allow
the user to understand in which ways the interaction was different and why a
given decision was made by the system.200
In order to build this kind of explanations for a given user we calculate
the quartiles and the interquartile range (IQR) of each feature, considering the
data of that user in the central database. Based on these values, we define
the normal upper and lower limits for each feature, as proposed by [13] and as
defined by equations loweru,i = Q1u,i − 1.5 ∗ IQRu,i and upperu,i = Q3u,i +205
1.5 ∗ IQRu,i. These limits represent the boundaries between which each user
normally interacts.
Using these limits we can then build graphical visualizations such as those
in Figure 4. The left image simply shows the average values of the features for
three different users, allowing to perceive how the interaction is different. For210
instance, User 1 has significantly higher values of minimum of touch duration
and of maximum touch intensity, which clearly separate him from the others.
The right image shows the upper and lower limits of User 1, compared against
an instance of his own interaction (dotted line) against that of another user
(User 2, dashed line). Visualizations such as these allow to perceive why a given215
instance may be classified as a positive or as a negative.
5. Conclusions and Future Work
This paper proposed an approach for continuous authentication using be-
havioral biometrics. It is completely non-intrusive and transparent, does not
require any specific hardware, and is based on 12 interaction features. These220
features describe several modalities of interaction such as time, intensity and
area. Individual interaction models are built that allow to determine if a given
instance of interaction belongs or not to the supposed owner of the device.
An online authentication service was developed that can be easily integrated
by mobile app and device developers. The service is also able to generate visual225
explanations about the differences observed between the interaction and the
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Figure 4: (a) Graphical representation of the average values of each interaction feature, for
three users. (b) Graphical representation of the interaction profile of User 1, and comparison
with two instances for classification, one from the same user and another from a different one.
model.
Current work focuses on scaling the system to the magnitude of hundreds
of users, to assess the suitability of the approach, not only in terms of compu-
tational efficiency but also in terms of accuracy. Once this step is complete,230
we will compare the pros and cons of this approach with existing ones, namely
in terms of accuracy, usability and easiness of implementation/integration. We
will also improve the Explanations module to generate text that can be used
together with the visualizations.
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